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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PERRY MESSICK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 16605

PHD TRUCKING SERVICE, EJC. ,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPmTDENTS

STAT:t:l1ENT OF l'HE '.!ATURE OF THE CASE
This was an action for an accounting between a truck
driver-operator and a trucking service to determine whether
monies were due and owing or whether a settlement had been
effected.
DISPOSI'.LIO~J

rn

TliE LOWER COURT

The case was tried on April 19, 1979, before the Honorable
Allen B. Sorensen, Judge of the District Court of Utah County.

The

court found that the parties had reached an accord and satisfaction
on October 22, 1976, and entered judgI!lent against the plaintiffappellant, no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT

m~

APPEAL

Defendant-Respondent prays the court to affirm the findings
and judgment of the trial court.
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STATUn:::l'I' OF FACTS
From January, 1973, to December, 1973, plaintiffappellant was an employee truck driver of PHD Trucking Service,
Inc.

R. 122, 8-10.

Toward the end of 1973, plaintiff approac',

Verl Davies and Ray Hiatt, the owners and principal officers
of PHD Trucking, and asked i f he could buy a truck from them.
R. 122, 19-3J; R. 123 1-14.
On December 7, 1973, plaintiff entered into a buy-sell
agreement with Verl Davies and Ray Hiatt, owners and principal
officers of PHD Trucking, for the purchase of a 1963 Kenmore
Tractor.

Plaintiff paid $2,000.00 dovm and gave a note forthe

balance of $8, 000. 00 to Davies and Hiatt.

It was further agreec

that the revenue from the truck operation would be handled throu;
PHD Trucking Service and that the cost of fuel,

license plates,

property tax, highway use tax, repair parts and insurance
premiums \Jere to be deducted from the proceeds earned by the
operation of the truck.

I

Also charged as an advance to the

operation of the truck was $175.00 per week to plaintiff.

Plaid

agreed to lease a durlp trailer from Davies and Hiatt to use on
the job, at the rate of 5 cents per r:iile, and also to provid~
certain insurance on the trailer
Shortly after that.

Ex. 9.

in January, 1974, nlaintiff

lli11:'
I

agreed that, rather t!Hn receive the Sl75.00 per week, he would
instead be paid for whatever he earned for driving the truck
R.

143,

5-27.
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All hauling done by the plaintiff for the defendant,
PHD L'rucking, was performed on a per job tonnage basis.

R. 186,

10-13; R. 190, 16-21; R. 193, 20-30; R. 194, 16-23; R. 208, 20-29;
R. 212,

24-30, 213, 1-22

(See also Ex. 26, 27).

Plaintiff kept Exhibits 26 and 27 as his only daily
record of the trips which he made in the truck.

R. 132, 19-26.

By his own records, which were introduced at trial, plaintiff
only kept track of the invoice nunber, the point of origin and
the weight of each load which he carried as he oµerated the truck.
Ex. 26, 27.

From these daily records, the plaintiff turned in

his invoices to PED Trucking Service, Inc., for credit to his
account.

R. 150, 8-20.

In fact, all of the driver-operators

working through PHD Trucking Service were paid on a tonnage hauled
basis .

R . 1 6 9 , 18 - 3 0 , 1 7 0 , 1.
So that plaintiff could continue to operate the truck,

the parties signed a lease form dated January 1, 1974, (Ex. 3),
for the purpose of meeting the Public Service CoOITJissions authority
requireraents.
R. 186,

R. 95, 24-30, 96, 1-4; R. 167, 16-30, 168, 1-9;

6-9; R. 193, 19,20; R. 223, 8-21; R. 224, 19-30, 225, 1.
The lease form signed on Januc"ry 1, 1974, was for a

period from January 1, 1974, to July 1, 1974.

However, during

this time the plaintiff continued to operate the truck on a
per trip tonnage basis, and continued to do so for the entire time
that he was an owner-operator of the truck.

Ex. 3, 26, 27.

On or before ~ovember 22, 1974, plaintiff was pulled
over at the Price Port of Entry and cited becau~e the first lease
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form had expireu.

':his precipitated a neH lease fon~ to

give plaintiff authority to operate under PHD Trucking Services
Certificate of Authority. Exhibit

4

R. 125, 11-30, 126, 1-4

In May of 1975, the plaintiff ceased hauling fort~
defendant and leased his truck out to other companies, and had
the income from the truck paid directly to him instead of PHD
Trucking, in contravention of the buy-sell agreement.

Ex. 9.

The reason the plaintiff gave for this action was that he belie·:;
that he had paid for the truck under the terms of the buy-sell
R. 126, 8-12.

agreement.

Throughout this period and into the Fall of 1976,
the defendant made nlli:lerous requests that plaintiff account to
them for the expenses incurred by plaintiff in operating the
truck.

The defendant gave plaintiff Exhibits 5 and 6 in the

Spring of 1976, again requesting that he verify his expenses.
R.

220, 221.
An accounting of plaintiff's payments on the truck,

the money he had been paid for operating the truck, and his
obligation to defendant under the buy-sell agreement was given
to plaintiff in early October, 1976.
the accounting,

R. 123.

After receiving

the plaintiff offered to return the truck to

Davies and Hiatt, asking for a settlement of $2,500.00.
October 22, 19 7 6,

On

t h e p 1 ainti· f t- accepte d a counter-offer settle-I

in the amount of $2,000.00 minus $473.97 for a fuel bill charge:
by plaintiff to defendant, and reconveyed all of his interest

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 5-

in the truck.

R. 130; Ex. 7.

Plaintiff continued working for defendant for some time
after the settlement was reached.

R. 184, 11-15.

In July, 1977,

nine months after the settlement was reached, and several months
after plaintiff

~uitdriving

for defendant, this lawsuit was

brought in an attempt to raise again the issues of the accounting
between plaintiff and defendant, which had been settled by the
parties in October, 1976.

R. 2.

Having received evidence and having heard the testimony
of the witnesses and considered their credibility during the
trial of this matter, the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen found that
the dealings between the parties had been settled in the settlement
agreement on t:1e accounting in 1976, and entered judgment
against the plaintiff, no cause of action.

R. 47.

Plaintiff's Motion for a new trial was denied (R. 69)
and his appeal ensued.

A R G U fl E N T
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FEIDINGS OF FACTS SHOULD BE
ACCEPTED UllLESS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Plaintiff asserts in his brief that this court, ·~ust
conduct an independent evaluation of the evidence in the record."
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, 12.

However, a careful analysis

of the scope of review in equity cases by this court reveals that
it can nodify the trial court's findings or make new findings only
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if the record compels it.
Demiris,

10 Utah 2d 405,

First Security Bank of Utah vs.

354 P2d 97 (1960).

The general rule on the scope of review of the find~~
of a trial court in equity is clearly set forth by the court ~
the following cases:
In an equity case in which the Supreme Court reviews
the Findings of Fact of the trial court, it over
turns them only where it is manifest that the trial
court has misapplied proven facts or made findings
clearl a a inst the wei ht of evidence. ~etro~olitan
Investment Co. vs. Sine,
Utah u
, 376 P2 940,
(Emphasis added).
In equity cases the Supreme Court reviews the evidence
keeping in mind that the trial court heard and saw
the witnesses, and reverses if the court concludes
the the evidence clearly nreponderates against the
decision.
Barker vs. Dunham, 9 Utah 2d 244, 342
P2d 867,
(Emphasis added).
Although the question of a boundary line by
acquiescence is a matter of equity, the Supreme Court
will reverse the trial court's Findings of Fact~
if it concludes that they are clearly erroneous.
!lunley vs. lfalker, 13 Utah 2d 105, 369 P2d 117,
(Eophasis added).
The above cases set forth the requirment that before
this court can reverse the Findings of Fact of the trial comt
in an equity case,

this court must first find the trial court's

Findings of Fact to be "clearingly against the weight

of

evidence" or "clearly erroneous."
Although there was considerable conflict in the testi·
monies of plaintiff and defendant from which the trial court ~a:
to decide in order to make its Findings of Fact, this court
should keep in mind that the trial court heard and saw the w1 ···'
and could first hand observe their demeanor, candidness, or
lack thereof.

This is in keeping 11ith. the rule stated in
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Stone vs. Stone, 19 IJtah 2d 378, 431 P2d 802, in which the court
stated t'.l.a t, "Even thoui:;h the Constitution states that in equity
cases the court may review the facts, the court will nevertheless
take into account the advantaged position of the trial judge."
A review of the entire record of this case adequately
supports the trial court's Findings of Fact that the parties
came to a settlement agreement as to the amount of monies due
and owing to plaintiff for operating the truck and monies due
and owing the defendant under the purchase agreement on the truck.
Although there was conflicting testimony as to these material
facts,

the record is entirely adequate to support the trial

court's conclusion that the parties reached an accord and satisfaction in October, 1976.

The decision of the trial court was

neither "clearly erroneous" or "clearly against the weight of the
evidence," and this court should affirm the Findings of Fact of
the trial court.
POINT I I

THE FACTS AS SET FORTH IN THE RECORD AMPLY SUPPORT
THE TRIAL COURT'S DEC IS ION.
While there were many conflicting factual allegations
made by the plaintiff and defendant, some of the facts were
undisputed by the parties.

Both plaintiff and defendant agreed

that all monies earned by the operation of the truck would be
paid to PHD Trucking Service. Certain expenses were to be deducted
for the costs of operation,

and

included in the deductions
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would be all payments made to the plaintiff for operating the
truck,

and

the difference was to be credited or debited to

the plaintiff for the purchase of the truck.

Both parties

also agreed that an accounting was offered by the defendant to
the plaintiff in October, 1976,

including the monies credited

to the truck for its operation, the expenses of operating the
truck,

including payr.ients made to plaintiff as driver, and the

balance due and owing on the truck under the terms of the buysell agreement.

The dispute arises as to whether the settlement

which was reached in October of 1976 was a settlement of the

i
I

accounting given to the plaintiff by defendant, or whether the
plaintiff was merely selling the truck back.
It is clear fror.1 the record that the accounting on
the operation of the truck was a dispute.

In this disagreer:ient, I

I

defendant claimed $8,971.02 still owing on the truck after
crediting plaintiff with net earnings from the operation of t~
truck.

Ex. 2.

Plaintiff claimed that he had earned enough to

pay for the truck.

R. 126, 7-12.

The disagreenent >ms really over whether plaintiff o•,:<
defendant on the truck as per Exhibit "Q' or whether the truck
was paid for and defendant owed ?laintiff.

Realizing that t~e

truck was the central object of the accounting,

the trial cour'.

upon examining Exhibit 7 and the testimony of the witnesses,

.

,.J

made a findings of fact that the parties had entered into a se ..
and agreement on October 22,

1976.

As stated by the Suprene Court of the State of Kai:s'
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"an accord and satisfaction is the adjustment of a disagreement
as to what is due from one party to another and the payment of
the agreed amount."

Manning vs. Woods, Inc., 182 Kan. 640,

324 P2d 136.

Therefore, it was just and proper for the trial court
to conclude that the parties had an accord and satisfaction, whereby
the truck ,,,as returned to defendant and a settleraent of $1,526.03
was paid to plaintiff.

POINT III
PAROL EVIDEllCE IS ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW THAT THE
PARTIES DID imT DlTEND THE PP-OVISI0!1S OF THE
LEASE FORl'IS TO BE VALID.
Plaintiff asserts that the court erred in admitting
parol evidence to modify the terms of the lease forms used by
the parties to confer operating authority on plaintiff.

However,

a careful review of the record reveals no instance where defendant
sought to nodify the terms of the lease forms.

Defendant asserted

that it was not intended or understood by either party that
the lease forms be binding as such.
"Evidence is admissible, at least in equity, to
show that a writing which apparently constituted
a contract was not intended or understood by
either party to be binding as such. The oral
testimony in such a case does not vary the terms
of the writing but shous that it was never intended
to be a contract or to be a binding force between
the parties.
"'.Lhe parol evidence rule presupposes an action based
on an existing valid contract, and if the issue
is as to the validity or legality of the contract,
the rule, by its very terms, has no applicat~on,
and extrinsic evidence is admitted to determine that
issue, whether such evidence tends to establish the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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validit~ or invalidity of the contract in question

Such evidence does not vary or contradict the
writing, but serves to establish that it has no
force or efficacy." 30 Am Jur 2d 1034, 35.
There was clear and convincing evidence that the
leases were only used to r.ieet public service commissiori author::
requirements.
R.

186,

R.

95,

24-30,

96,

1-4; R. 167, 16-30, 168, 1-9.

6-9; R. 193, 19, 20; R. 223, 3-21; R. 224, 19-30, 225,,

And that the only reason the second lease form was prepared was'
because plaintiff has been cited for driving without public serj
commission

authority.

R. 125, 11-30, 125, 1-4.
CO:lCLUSION

The record in this case is entirely adequate to supnc:
the trial court's findings of fact that the parties came to a
settlement agreement concerning the truck and its operation.
The court did not error in permitting parol evidence as to the
intention of the parties concerninb the lease forms.

,-he

ora~

testimony in this case was not to vary the terns of the lease.
but showed that the leases were never intended to be a contracc ·
or to be a binding force between tl-ie parties.

The findings

of the trial court were not clearly against the weight of
evidence nor clearly erroneous, and this court should affir~
the findings of fact of the trial court.

Havin13 found a settle-~

agreement obtained the parties in October, 1976, with oayoent
to the plaintiff of a disputed sur.i and reconveyance to t h e Jefd
of the truck,

the court's conclusion that the parties have

3 .:

accord and satisfaction is supported by its findin:=;s of fac~;
the record in this case.
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For the above reasons, defendant respectfully submits
that the findings and judgment of the trial court should be
affimed.
DATED this 10th day of December, 1979.

Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
!JAILED two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondents
to Jackson Howard, Howard, Lewis & Petersen, Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellant, 120 East 300 North, Provo, Utah
postage prepaid, this

4

84601,

day
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